

No. _____, Original

In the Supreme Court of the United States

STATE OF TEXAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, STATE OF
STATE OF GEORGIA, STATE OF MICHIGAN, AND
STATE OF WISCONSIN,

Defendants.

**BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO FILE BILL OF COMPLAINT**

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STATE OF WISCONSIN,

Defendants.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE

Pursuant to S.Ct. Rule 17.3 and U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, the State of Texas (“Plaintiff State”) respectfully submits this brief in support of its Motion for Leave to File a Bill of Complaint against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the States of Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin (collectively, “Defendant States”).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Lawful elections are at the heart of our freedoms. “No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, 10 (1964). Trust in the integrity of that process

is the glue that binds our citizenry and the States in this Union.

Elections face the competing goals of maximizing and counting *lawful* votes but minimizing and excluding *unlawful* ones. *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964); *Bush v. Gore*, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) (“the votes eligible for inclusion in the certification are the votes meeting the properly established legal requirements”) (“*Bush II*”); compare 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(1)-(2) (2018) with *id.* § 20501(b)(3)-(4). Moreover, “the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 555. Reviewing election results requires not only counting lawful votes but also eliminating unlawful ones.

It is an understatement to say that 2020 was not a good year. In addition to a divided and partisan national mood, the country faced the COVID-19 pandemic. Certain officials in Defendant States presented the pandemic as the justification for ignoring state laws regarding absentee and mail-in voting. Defendant States flooded their citizenry with tens of millions of ballot applications and ballots ignoring statutory controls as to how they were received, evaluated, and counted. Whether well intentioned or not, these unconstitutional and unlawful changes had the same *uniform effect*—they made the 2020 election less secure in Defendant States. Those changes were made in violation of relevant state laws and were made by non-legislative entities, without any consent by the state legislatures.

These unlawful acts thus directly violated the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; *id.* art. II, § 1, cl. 2.

This case presents a question of law: Did Defendant States violate the Electors Clause by taking non-legislative actions to change the election rules that would govern the appointment of presidential electors? Each of these States flagrantly violated the statutes enacted by relevant State legislatures, thereby violating the Electors Clause of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the Constitution. By these unlawful acts, Defendant States have not only tainted the integrity of their own citizens' votes, but their actions have also debased the votes of citizens in the States that remained loyal to the Constitution.

Elections for federal office must comport with federal constitutional standards, *see Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 103-105, and executive branch government officials cannot subvert these constitutional requirements, no matter their stated intent. For presidential elections, each State must appoint its electors to the electoral college in a manner that complies with the Constitution, specifically the Electors Clause requirement that only state *legislatures* may set the rules governing the appointment of electors and the elections upon which such appointment is based.¹

¹ Subject to override by Congress, state legislatures have the exclusive power to regulate the time, place, and manner for electing Members of Congress, *see* U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, which is distinct from legislatures' exclusive and plenary authority on the appointment of presidential electors. When non-legislative actors purport to set state election law for presidential elections, they violate both the Elections Clause and the Electors Clause.

Constitutional Background

The right to vote is protected by the by the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3-4. Because “the right to vote is personal,” *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 561-62 (alterations omitted), “[e]very voter in a federal ... election, whether he votes for a candidate with little chance of winning or for one with little chance of losing, has a right under the Constitution to have his vote fairly counted.” *Anderson v. United States*, 417 U.S. 211, 227 (1974); *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962). Invalid or fraudulent votes debase or dilute the weight of each validly cast vote. *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 105. The unequal treatment of votes within a state, and unequal standards for processing votes raise equal protection concerns. *Id.* Though *Bush II* did not involve an action between States, the concern that illegal votes can cancel out lawful votes does not stop at a State’s boundary in the context of a Presidential election.

The Electors Clause requires that each State “shall appoint” its presidential electors “in such Manner as the *Legislature thereof* may direct.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added); *cf. id.* art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (similar for time, place, and manner of federal legislative elections). “[T]he state legislature’s power to select the manner for appointing electors is *plenary*,” *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 104 (emphasis added), and sufficiently *federal* for this Court’s review. *Bush v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd.*, 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (“*Bush I*”). This textual feature of our Constitution was adopted to ensure the integrity of the presidential selection process: “Nothing was more

to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption.” FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton). When a State conducts a popular election to appoint electors, the State must comply with all constitutional requirements. *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 104. When a State fails to conduct a valid election—for any reason—the electors may be appointed on a subsequent day in such a manner *as the legislature of such State may direct.*” 3 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).

Non-Legislative Changes Made in Violation of the Electors Clause

As set forth in the Complaint, executive and judicial officials made significant changes to the legislatively defined election rules in Defendant States. *See* Compl. at ¶¶ 66-73 (Georgia), 80-93 (Michigan), 44-55 (Pennsylvania), 106-24 (Wisconsin). Taken together, these non-legislative changes did away with statutory ballot-security measures for absentee and mail-in ballots such as signature verification, witness requirements, and statutorily authorized secure ballot drop-off locations.

Citing the COVID-19 pandemic, Defendant States gutted the safeguards for absentee ballots through non-legislative actions, despite knowledge that absentee ballots are “the largest source of potential voter fraud,” BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, at 46 (Sept. 2005) (hereinafter, “CARTER-BAKER”), which is magnified when absentee balloting is shorn of ballot-integrity measures such as signature verification, witness requirements, or outer-envelope protections, or when absentee ballots

are processed and tabulated without bipartisan observation by poll watchers.

Without Defendant States' combined 62 electoral votes, President Trump presumably has 232 electoral votes, and former Vice President Biden presumably has 244. Thus, Defendant States' presidential electors will determine the outcome of the election. Alternatively, if Defendant States are unable to certify 37 or more presidential electors, neither candidate will have a majority in the electoral college, in which case the election would devolve to the House of Representatives under the Twelfth Amendment.

Defendant States experienced serious voting irregularities. *See* Compl. at ¶¶ 75-76 (Georgia), 97-101 (Michigan), 55-60 (Pennsylvania), 122-28 (Wisconsin). At the time of this filing, Plaintiff State continues to investigate allegations of not only unlawful votes being counted but also fraud. Plaintiff State reserves the right to seek leave to amend the complaint as those investigations resolve. *See* S.Ct. Rule 17.2; FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(A)-(B), (a)(2). But even the *appearance* of fraud in a close election is poisonous to democratic principles: "Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised." *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006); *Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd.*, 553 U.S. 181, 189 (2008) (States have an interest in preventing voter fraud and ensuring voter confidence).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court considers two primary factors when it decides whether to grant a State leave to file a bill of complaint against another State: (1) "the nature of the

interest of the complaining State,” and (2) “the availability of an alternative forum in which the issue tendered can be resolved.” *Mississippi v. Louisiana*, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992) (internal quotations omitted) Because original proceedings in this Court follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, S.Ct. Rule 17.2, the facts for purposes of a motion for leave to file are the well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint. *Hernandez v. Mesa*, 137 S.Ct. 2003, 2005 (2017).

ARGUMENT

I. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF STATE’S CLAIMS.

In order to grant leave to file, this Court first must assure itself of its jurisdiction, *Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t.*, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998); *cf. Foman v. Davis*, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (courts deny leave to file amended pleadings that would be futile). That standard is met here. Plaintiff State’s fundamental rights and interests are at stake. This Court is the *only* venue that can protect Plaintiff State’s electoral college votes from being cancelled by the unlawful and constitutionally tainted votes cast by electors appointed and certified by Defendant States.

A. The claims fall within this Court’s constitutional and statutory subject-matter jurisdiction.

The federal judicial power extends to “Controversies between two or more States.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, and Congress has placed the jurisdiction for such suits exclusively with the Supreme Court: “The Supreme Court shall have original *and exclusive* jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)

(emphasis added). This Court not only is a permissible court for hearing this action; it is the only court that can hear this action quickly enough to render relief sufficient to avoid constitutionally tainted votes in the electoral college and to place the appointment of Defendant States' electors before their legislatures pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 2 in time for a vote in the House of Representatives on January 6, 2021. *See* 3 U.S.C. § 15. With that relief in place, the House can resolve the election on January 6, 2021, in time for the president to be selected by the constitutionally set date of January 20. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.

B. The claims arise under the Constitution.

When States violate their own election laws, they may argue that these violations are insufficiently federal to allow review in this Court. *Cf. Foster v. Chatman*, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 1745-46 (2016) (this Court lacks jurisdiction to review state-court decisions that “rest[] on an adequate and independent state law ground”). That attempted evasion would fail for two reasons.

First, in the election context, a state-court remedy or a state executive's administrative action purporting to alter state election statutes implicates the Electors Clause. *See Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 105. Even a plausible federal-law defense to state action arises under federal law within the meaning of Article III. *Mesa v. California*, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989) (holding that “it is the raising of a federal question in the officer's removal petition that constitutes the federal law under which the action against the federal officer arises for Art. III purposes”). Constitutional arising-under jurisdiction exceeds statutory federal-question

jurisdiction of federal district courts,² and—indeed—we did not even have federal-question jurisdiction until 1875. *Merrell Dow Pharm.*, 478 U.S. at 807. Plaintiff States’ Electoral Clause claims arise under the Constitution and so are *federal*, even if the only claim is that Defendant States violated their own state election statutes. Moreover, as is explained below, Defendant States’ actions injure the interests of Plaintiff State in the appointment of electors to the electoral college in a manner that is inconsistent with the Constitution.

Given this federal-law basis against these state actions, the state actions are not “independent” of the federal constitutional requirements that provide this Court jurisdiction. *Fox Film Corp. v. Muller*, 296 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1935); *cf. City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons*, 522 U.S. 156, 164 (1997) (noting that “even though state law creates a party’s causes of action, its case might still ‘arise under’ the laws of the United States if a well-pleaded complaint established that its right to relief under state law requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law” and collecting cases) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Plaintiff State’s claims therefore fall within this Court’s jurisdiction.

Second, state election law is not purely a matter of state law because it applies “not only to elections to state offices, but also to the election of Presidential

² The statute for federal officer removal at issue in *Mesa* omits the well-pleaded complaint rule, *id.*, which is a *statutory* restriction on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See *Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson*, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).

electors,” meaning that state law operates, in part, “by virtue of a direct grant of authority made under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution.” *Bush I*, 531 U.S. at 76. Logically, “any state authority to regulate election to [federal] offices could not precede their very creation by the Constitution,” meaning that any “such power had to be delegated to, rather than reserved by, the States.” *Cook v. Gralike*, 531 U.S. 510, 522 (2001) (internal quotations omitted). “It is no original prerogative of State power to appoint a representative, a senator, or President for the Union.” J. Story, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 627 (3d ed. 1858). For these reasons, any “significant departure from the legislative scheme for appointing Presidential electors presents a federal constitutional question.” *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

Under these circumstances, this Court has the power both to review and to remedy a violation of the Constitution. Significantly, parties do not need winning hands to establish jurisdiction. Instead, jurisdiction exists when “the right of the petitioners to recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States are given one construction,” even if the right “will be defeated if they are given another.” *Bell v. Hood*, 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946). At least as to *jurisdiction*, a plaintiff need survive only the low threshold that “the alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statutes [not] ... be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or ... wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” *Id.* at 682. The bill of complaint meets that test.

**C. The claims raise a “case or controversy”
between the States.**

Like any other action, an original action must meet the Article III criteria for a case or controversy: “it must appear that the complaining State has suffered a wrong through the action of the other State, furnishing ground for judicial redress, or is asserting a right against the other State which is susceptible of judicial enforcement according to the accepted principles of the common law or equity systems of jurisprudence.” *Maryland v. Louisiana*, 451 U.S. 725, 735-36 (1981) (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff State has standing under those rules.³

With voting, “the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 105 (quoting *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 555). In presidential elections, “the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States.” *Anderson v. Celebrezze*, 460 U.S. 780, 795 (1983). Thus, votes in Defendant States affect the votes in Plaintiff State, as set forth in more detail below.

³ At its constitutional minimum, standing doctrine measures the necessary effect on plaintiffs under a tripartite test: cognizable injury to the plaintiffs, causation by the challenged conduct, and redressable by a court. *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992). The rules for standing in state-versus-state actions is the same as the rules in other actions under Article III. See *Maryland v. Louisiana*, 451 U.S. 725, 736 (1981).

1. **Plaintiff State suffers an injury in fact.**

The citizens of Plaintiff State have the right to demand that all other States abide by the constitutionally set rules in appointing presidential electors to the electoral college. “No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” *Wesberry*, 376 U.S. at 10; *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“the political franchise of voting” is “a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights”). “Every voter in a federal ... election, whether he votes for a candidate with little chance of winning or for one with little chance of losing, has a right under the Constitution to have his vote fairly counted.” *Anderson v. United States*, 417 U.S. at 227; *Baker*, 369 U.S. at 208. Put differently, “a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction,” *Dunn v. Blumstein*, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972), and—unlike the residency durations required in *Dunn*—the “jurisdiction” here is the entire United States. In short, the rights at issue are congeable under Article III.

Significantly, Plaintiff State presses its own form of voting-rights injury *as States*. As with the one-person, one-vote principle for congressional redistricting in *Wesberry*, the equality of the States arises from the structure of the Constitution, not from the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. See *Wesberry*, 376 U.S. at 7-8; *id.* n.10 (expressly not

reaching claims under Fourteenth Amendment). Whereas the House represents the People proportionally, the Senate represents the States. *See* U.S. CONST. art. V, cl. 3 (“no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate”). While Americans likely care more about who is elected President, the States have a distinct interest in who is elected *Vice President* and thus who can cast the tie-breaking vote in the Senate. Through that interest, States suffer an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election. This injury is particularly acute in 2020, where a Senate majority often will hang on the Vice President’s tie-breaking vote because of the nearly equal—and, depending on the outcome of Georgia run-off elections in January, possibly *equal*—balance between political parties. Quite simply, it is vitally important to the States who becomes Vice President.

Because individual citizens may arguably suffer only a generalized grievance from Electors Clause violations, States have standing where their citizen voters would not, *Lance v. Coffman*, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (distinguishing citizen plaintiffs from citizen relators who sued in the name of a state). In *Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency*, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), this Court held that states seeking to protect their sovereign interests are “entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.” *Id.* at 520. While *Massachusetts* arose in a different context—the same principles of federalism apply equally here to require special deference to the sovereign states on standing questions.

In addition to standing for their own injuries, States can assert *parens patriae* standing for their citizens who are presidential electors.⁴ Like legislators, presidential electors assert “legislative injury” whenever allegedly improper actions deny them a working majority. *Coleman v. Miller*, 307 U.S. 433, 435 (1939). The electoral college is a zero-sum game. If Defendant States’ unconstitutionally appointed electors vote for a presidential candidate opposed by the Plaintiff State’s electors, that operates to defeat Plaintiff State’s interests.⁵ Indeed, even without an electoral college majority, presidential electors suffer the same voting-debasement injury as voters generally: “It must be remembered that ‘the

⁴ “The ‘*parens patriae*’ doctrine ... is a recognition of the principle that the state, when a party to a suit involving a matter of sovereign interest, ‘must be deemed to represent all its citizens.’” *New Jersey v. New York*, 345 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1953) (quoting *Kentucky v. Indiana*, 281 U.S. 163, 173 (1930)).

⁵ Because Plaintiff State appointed its electors consistent with the Constitution, they suffer injury if its electors are defeated by Defendant States’ unconstitutionally appointed electors. This injury is all the more acute because Plaintiff State has taken steps to prevent fraud. For example, Texas does not allow no excuse vote by mail (Texas Election Code Sections 82.001-82.004); has strict signature verification procedures (Tex. Election Code §87.027(j)); Early voting ballot boxes have two locks and different keys and other strict security measures (Tex. Election Code §§85.032(d) & 87.063); requires voter ID (House Comm. on Elections, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 148, 83d R.S. (2013)); has witness requirements for assisting those in need (Tex. Election Code §§ 86.0052 & 86.0105), and does not allow ballot harvesting (Tex. Election Code 86.006(f)(1-6)). Unlike Defendant States, Plaintiff State neither weakened nor allowed the weakening of its ballot-integrity statutes by non-legislative means.

right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 105 (quoting *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (“*Bush II*”). Finally, once Plaintiff State has standing to challenge Defendant States’ unlawful actions, Plaintiff State may do so on any legal theory that undermines those actions. *Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Evtl. Study Group, Inc.*, 438 U.S. 59, 78-81 (1978); *DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno*, 547 U.S. 332, 353 & n.5 (2006). Injuries to Plaintiff State’s electors serve as an Article III basis for a *parens patriae* action.

2. Defendant States caused the injuries.

Non-legislative officials in Defendant States either directly caused the challenged violations of the Electors Clause or, in the case of Georgia, acquiesced to them in settling a federal lawsuit. The Defendants thus caused the Plaintiff’s injuries.

3. The requested relief would redress the injuries.

This Court has authority to redress Plaintiff State’s injuries, and the requested relief will do so.

First, while Defendant States are responsible for their elections, this Court has authority to enjoin reliance on *unconstitutional* elections:

When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight

accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.

Bush II, 531 U.S. at 104; *City of Boerne v. Flores*, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (“power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary”). Plaintiff State does not ask this Court to decide who won the election; they only ask that the Court enjoin the clear violations of the Electors Clause of the Constitution.

Second, the relief that Plaintiff State requests—namely, remand to the State legislatures to allocate electors in a manner consistent with the Constitution—does not violate Defendant States’ rights or exceed this Court’s power. The power to select electors is a plenary power of the State legislatures, and this remains so, without regard to state law:

This power is conferred upon the legislatures of the States by the Constitution of the United States, and cannot be taken from them or modified by their State constitutions.... Whatever provisions may be made by statute, or by the state constitution, to choose electors by the people, there is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken away nor abdicated.

McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (internal quotations omitted); *accord Bush I*, 531 U.S. at 76-77; *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 104.

Third, uncertainty of how Defendant States’ legislatures will allocate their electors is irrelevant to the question of redressability:

If a reviewing court agrees that the agency misinterpreted the law, it will set aside the agency's action and remand the case – even though the agency ... might later, in the exercise of its lawful discretion, reach the same result for a different reason.

FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998). Defendant States' legislatures would remain free to exercise their plenary authority under the Electors Clause in any *constitutional* manner they wish. Under *Akins*, the simple act of reconsideration under lawful means is redress enough.

Fourth, the requested relief is consistent with federal election law: "Whenever any State has held an election for the purpose of choosing electors, and has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be appointed on a subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such State may direct." 3 U.S.C. § 2. Regardless of the statutory deadlines for the electoral college to vote, this Court could enjoin reliance on the results from the constitutionally tainted November 3 election, remand the appointment of electors to Defendant States, and order Defendant States' legislatures to certify their electors in a manner consistent with the Constitution, which could be accomplished well in advance of the statutory deadline of January 6 for House to count the presidential electors' votes. 3 U.S.C. § 15.

D. This action is not moot and will not become moot.

None of the looming election deadlines are constitutional, and they all are within this Court's power to enjoin. Indeed, if this Court vacated a State's

appointment of presidential electors, those electors could not vote on December 14, 2020; if the Court vacated their vote after the fact, the House of Representatives could not count those votes on January 6, 2021. Moreover, any remedial action can be complete well before January 6, 2020. Indeed, even the swearing in of the next President on January 20, 2021, will not moot this case because review could outlast even the selection of the next President under “the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ doctrine,” which applies “in the context of election cases ... when there are ‘as applied’ challenges as well as in the more typical case involving only facial attacks.” *FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.*, 551 U.S. 449, 463 (2007) (internal quotations omitted); *accord Norman v. Reed*, 502 U.S. 279, 287-88 (1992). Mootness is not, and will not become, an issue here.

E. This matter is ripe for review.

Plaintiff State’s claims are clearly ripe now, but they were not ripe before the election: “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” *Texas v. United States*, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Prior to the election, there was no reason to know who would win the vote in any given State.

Ripeness also raises the question of laches, which Justice Blackmun called “precisely the opposite argument” from ripeness. *Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n*, 497 U.S. 871, 915 n.16 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Laches is an equitable defense against unreasonable delay in commencing suit. *Petrella v. MGM*, 572 U.S. 663, 667 (2014). This action was

neither unreasonably delayed nor is prejudicial to Defendant States.

Before the election, Plaintiff States had no ripe claim against a Defendant State:

“One cannot be guilty of laches until his right ripens into one entitled to protection. For only then can his torpor be deemed inexcusable.”

What-A-Burger of Va., Inc. v. Whataburger, Inc., 357 F.3d 441, 449-50 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31: 19 (4th ed. 2003); *Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp.*, 60 F.3d 770, 777 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (same); *Profitness Physical Therapy Ctr. v. Profit Orthopedic & Sports Physical Therapy P.C.*, 314 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2002) (same). Plaintiff State could not have brought this action before the election results. The extent of the county-level deviations from election statutes in Defendant States became evident well after the election. Neither ripeness nor laches presents a timing problem here.

F. This action does not raise a non-justiciable political question.

The “political questions doctrine” does not apply here. Under that doctrine, federal courts will decline to review issues that the Constitution delegates to one of the other branches—the “political branches”—of government. While picking electors involves political rights, the Supreme Court has ruled in a line of cases beginning with *Baker* that constitutional claims related to voting (other than claims brought under the Guaranty Clause) are justiciable in the federal courts. As the Court held in *Baker*, litigation over political rights is not the same as a political question:

We hold that this challenge to an apportionment presents no nonjusticiable “political question.” The mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political question. Such an objection “is little more than a play upon words.”

Baker, 369 U.S. at 209. This is no political question; it is a constitutional one that this Court should answer.

G. No adequate alternate remedy or forum exists.

In determining whether to hear a case under this Court’s original jurisdiction, the Court has considered whether a plaintiff State “has another adequate forum in which to settle [its] claim.” *United States v. Nevada*, 412 U.S. 534, 538 (1973). This equitable limit does not apply here because Plaintiff State cannot sue Defendant States in any other forum.

To the extent that Defendant States wish to avail themselves of 3 U.S.C. § 5’s safe harbor, *Bush I*, 531 U.S. at 77-78, this action will not meaningfully stand in their way:

The State, of course, after granting the franchise in the special context of Article II, can take back the power to appoint electors. ... There is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken away nor abdicated[.]

Bush II, 531 U.S. at 104 (citations and internal quotations omitted).⁶ Defendant States’ legislature

⁶ Indeed, the Constitution also includes another backstop: “if no person have such majority [of electoral votes], then from the

will remain free under the Constitution to appoint electors or vote in any *constitutional* manner they wish. The only thing that they cannot do—and should not wish to do—is to rely on an allocation conducted in violation of the Constitution to determine the appointment of presidential electors.

Moreover, if this Court agrees with Plaintiff State that Defendant States’ appointment of presidential electors under the recently conducted elections would be unconstitutional, then the statutorily created safe harbor cannot be used as a justification for a violation of the Constitution. The safe-harbor framework created by statute would have to yield in order to ensure that the Constitution was not violated.

It is of no moment that Defendants’ *state laws* may purport to tether state legislatures to popular votes. Those state limits on a state legislature’s exercising federal constitutional functions cannot block action because the federal Constitution “transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of a State” under this Court’s precedents. *Leser v. Garnett*, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922); *see also Bush I*, 531 U.S. at 77; *United States Term Limits v. Thornton*, 514 U.S. 779, 805 (1995) (“the power to regulate the incidents of the federal system is not a reserved power of the States, but rather is delegated by the Constitution”). As this Court recognized in *McPherson v. Blacker*, the authority to choose presidential electors:

persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot.” U.S. CONST. amend. XII.

is conferred upon the legislatures of the states by the Constitution of the United States, and cannot be taken from them or modified by their state constitutions. ... *Whatever provisions may be made by statute, or by the state constitution, to choose electors by the people, there is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken away or abdicated.*

146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). Defendant States would suffer no cognizable injury from this Court's enjoining their reliance on an unconstitutional vote.

II. THIS CASE PRESENTS CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS OF IMMENSE NATIONAL CONSEQUENCE THAT WARRANT THIS COURT'S DISCRETIONARY REVIEW.

Electoral integrity ensures the legitimacy of not just our governmental institutions, but the Republic itself. *See Wesberry*, 376 U.S. at 10. "Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised." *Purcell*, 549 U.S. at 4. Against that backdrop, few cases could warrant this Court's review more than this one. In addition, the constitutionality of the process for selecting the President is of extreme national importance. If Defendant States are permitted to violate the requirements of the Constitution in the appointment of their electors, the resulting vote of the electoral college not only lacks constitutional legitimacy, but the Constitution itself will be forever sullied.

Though the Court claims “discretion when accepting original cases, even as to actions between States where [its] jurisdiction is exclusive,” *Wyoming v. Oklahoma*, 502 U.S. 437, 450 (1992) (internal quotations omitted), this is not a case where the Court should apply that discretion “sparingly.” *Id.* While Plaintiff State disputes that exercising this Court’s original jurisdiction is discretionary, see Section III, *infra*, the clear unlawful abrogation of Defendant States’ election laws designed to ensure election integrity by a few officials, and examples of material irregularities in the 2020 election cumulatively warrant this Court’s exercising jurisdiction as this Court’s “unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.” *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 111; see also *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). While isolated irregularities could be “garden-variety” election irregularities that do not raise a federal question,⁷ the closeness of the presidential election results, combined with the unconstitutional setting-aside of state election laws by non-legislative actors call both the result and the process into question.

⁷ “To be sure, ‘garden variety election irregularities’ may not present facts sufficient to offend the Constitution’s guarantee of due process[.]” *Hunter v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections*, 635 F.3d 219, 232 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Griffin*, 570 F.2d at 1077-79)).

A. The 2020 election suffered from serious irregularities that constitutionally prohibit using the reported results.

Defendant States' administration of the 2020 election violated several constitutional requirements and, thus, violated the rights that Plaintiff State seeks to protect. "When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the *right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental*; and one source of *its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.*" *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 104.⁸ Even a State legislature vested with authority to regulate election procedures lacks authority to "abridg[e ...] fundamental rights, such as the right to vote." *Tashjian v. Republican Party*, 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986). As demonstrated in this section, Defendant States' administration of the 2020 election violated the Electors Clause, which renders invalid any appointment of electors based upon those election results, unless the relevant State legislatures review and modify or expressly ratify those results as sufficient to determine the appointment of electors. For example, even without fraud or nefarious intent, a mail-in vote not subjected to the State legislature's ballot-integrity measures cannot be counted.

It does not matter that a judicial or executive officer sought to bypass that screening in response to the COVID pandemic: the choice was not theirs to

⁸ The right to vote is "a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights." *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 561-62 (internal quotations omitted).

make. “Government is not free to disregard the [the Constitution] in times of crisis.” *Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York v. Cuomo*, 592 U.S. ___ (Nov. 25, 2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). With all unlawful votes discounted, the election result is an open question that this Court must address. Under 3 U.S.C. § 2, the State legislatures may answer the question, but the question must be asked here.

1. Defendant States violated the Electors Clause by modifying their legislatures’ election laws through non-legislative action.

The Electors Clause grants authority to *state legislatures* under both horizontal and vertical separation of powers. It provides authority to each State—not to federal actors—the authority to dictate the manner of selecting presidential electors. And within each State, it explicitly allocates that authority to a single branch of State government: to the “Legislature thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. State legislatures’ primacy *vis-à-vis* non-legislative actors—whether State or federal—is even more significant than congressional primacy *vis-à-vis* State legislatures.

The State legislatures’ authority is plenary. *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 104. It “cannot be taken from them or modified” even through “their state constitutions.” *McPherson*, 146 U.S. at 35; *Bush I*, 531 U.S. at 76-77; *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 104. The Framers allocated election authority to State legislatures as the branch closest—and most accountable—to the People. *See, e.g.*, Robert G. Natelson, *The Original Scope of the Congressional Power to Regulate Elections*, 13 U. PA.

J. CONST. L. 1, 31 (2010) (collecting Founding-era documents); *cf.* THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 350 (C. Rossiter, ed. 2003) (J. Madison) (“House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in its members a habitual recollection of their dependence on the people”). Thus, only the State legislatures are permitted to create or modify the respective State’s rules for the appointment of presidential electors. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.

“[T]here must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.” *Burdick v. Takushi*, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (interior quotations omitted). Thus, for example, deadlines are necessary, even if some votes sent via absentee ballot do not arrive timely. *Rosario v. Rockefeller*, 410 U.S. 752, 758 (1973). Even more importantly in this pandemic year with expanded mail-in voting, ballot-integrity measures—*e.g.*, witness requirements, signature verification, and the like—are an essential component of any legislative expansion of mail-in voting. *See* CARTER-BAKER, at 46 (absentee ballots are “the largest source of potential voter fraud”). Though it may be tempting to permit a breakdown of the constitutional order in the face of a global pandemic, the rule of law demands otherwise.

Specifically, because the Electors Clause makes clear that state legislative authority is exclusive, non-legislative actors lack authority to *amend* statutes. *Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar*, No. 20-542, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5188, at *4 (Oct. 28, 2020) (“there is a strong likelihood that the State Supreme Court

decision violates the Federal Constitution”) (Alito, J., concurring); *Wisconsin State Legis.*, No. 20A66, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5187, at *11-14 (Oct. 26, 2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay); *cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford*, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (“it is not within our power to construe and narrow state laws”); *Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.*, 561 U.S. 477, 509-10 (2010) (“editorial freedom ... [to “blue-pencil” statutes] belongs to the Legislature, not the Judiciary”). That said, courts can enjoin elections or even enforcement of *unconstitutional* election laws, but they cannot rewrite the law in federal presidential elections.

For example, if a state court enjoins or modifies ballot-integrity measures adopted to allow absentee or mail-in voting, that invalidates ballots cast under the relaxed standard unless the legislature has—prior to the election—ratified the new procedure. Without pre-election legislative ratification, results based on the treatment and tabulation of votes done in violation of state law cannot be used to appoint presidential electors.

Elections must be lawful contests, but they should not be mere *litigation contests* where the side with the most lawyers wins. As with the explosion of nationwide injunctions, the explosion of challenges to State election law for partisan advantage in the lead-up to the 2020 election “is not normal.” *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York*, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant of stay). Nor is it healthy. Under the “*Purcell* principle,” federal courts generally avoid enjoining state election laws in the period close to an election. *Purcell*, 549 U.S. at 4-5 (citing “voter

confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls”). *Purcell* raises valid concerns about confusion in the run-up to elections, but judicial election-related injunctions also raise *post-election* concerns. For example, if a state court enjoins ballot-integrity measures adopted to secure absentee or mail-in voting, that invalidates ballots cast under the relaxed standard unless the State legislature has had time to ratify the new procedure. Without either pre-election legislative ratification or a severability clause in the legislation that created the rules for absentee voting by mail, the state court’s actions operate to violate the Electors Clause.

2. State and local administrator’s systemic failure to follow State election qualifies as an unlawful amendment of State law.

When non-legislative state and local executive actors engage in systemic or intentional failure to comply with their State’s duly enacted election laws, they adopt by executive fiat a *de facto* equivalent of an impermissible amendment of State election law by an executive or judicial officer. *See* Section II.A.1, *supra*. This Court recognizes an executive’s “consciously and expressly adopt[ing] a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities” as another form of reviewable final action, even if the policy is not a written policy. *Heckler v. Chaney*, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985) (interior quotations omitted); *accord id.* at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring). Without a *bona fide* amendment to State election law *by the legislature*, executive officers must follow state law. *Cf. Morton v.*

Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974); *Service v. Dulles*, 354 U.S. 363, 388-89 (1957). The wrinkle here is that the non-legislative actors lack the authority under the federal Constitution to enact a *bona fide* amendment, regardless of whatever COVID-related emergency power they may have.

This form of executive nullification of state law by statewide, county, or city officers is a variant of impermissible amendment by a non-legislative actor. See Section II.A.1, *supra*. Such nullification is always unconstitutional, but it is especially egregious when it eliminates legislative safeguards for election integrity (*e.g.*, signature and witness requirements for absentee ballots, poll watchers⁹). Systemic failure by statewide, county, or city election officials to follow State election law is no more permissible than formal amendments by an executive or judicial actor.

3. Defendant States' administration of the 2020 election violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

In each of Defendant States, important rules governing the sending, receipt, validity, and counting of ballots were modified in a manner that varied from county to county. These variations from county to county violated the Equal Protection Clause, as this

⁹ Poll watchers are “prophylactic measures designed to prevent election fraud,” *Harris v. Conradi*, 675 F.2d 1212, 1216 n.10 (11th Cir. 1982), and “to insure against tampering with the voting process.” *Baer v. Meyer*, 728 F.2d 471, 476 (10th Cir. 1984). For example, poll monitors reported that 199 Chicago voters cast 300 party-line Democratic votes, as well as three party-line Republican votes in one election. *Barr v. Chatman*, 397 F.2d 515, 515-16 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1968).

Court explained at length in *Bush II*. Each vote must be treated equally. “When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.” *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 104. The Equal Protection Clause demands uniform “statewide standards for determining what is a legal vote.” *Id.* at 110.

Differential intrastate voting standards are “hostile to the one man, one vote basis of our representative government.” *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 107 (internal quotations omitted). These variations from county to county also appear to have operated to affect the election result. For example, the obstruction of poll-watcher requirements that occurred in Michigan’s Wayne County may have contributed to the unusually high number of more than 173,000 votes which are not tied to a registered voter and that 71 percent of the precincts are out of balance with no explanation. Compl. ¶ 97.

Regardless of whether the modification of legal standards in some counties in Defendant States tilted the election outcome in those States, it is clear that the standards for determining what is a legal vote varied greatly from county to county. That constitutes a clear violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and it calls into question the constitutionality of any Electors appointed by Defendant States based on such an unconstitutional election.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause protects the fundamental right to vote against “[t]he

disenfranchisement of a state electorate.” *Duncan v. Poythress*, 657 F.2d 691, 702 (5th Cir. 1981). Weakening or eliminating signature-validating requirements, then restricting poll watchers also undermines the 2020 election’s integrity—especially as practiced in urban centers with histories of electoral fraud—also violates substantive due process. *Griffin v. Burns*, 570 F.2d 1065, 1077 (1st Cir. 1978) (“violation of the due process clause may be indicated” if “election process itself reaches the point of patent and fundamental unfairness”); *see also Florida State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning*, 522 F.3d 1153, 1183-84 (11th Cir. 2008); *Roe v. State of Ala. By & Through Evans*, 43 F.3d 574, 580-82 (11th Cir. 1995); *Roe v. State of Ala.*, 68 F.3d 404, 407 (11th Cir. 1995); *Marks v. Stinson*, 19 F. 3d 873, 878 (3rd Cir. 1994). Defendant States made concerted efforts to weaken or nullify their legislatures’ ballot-integrity measures for the unprecedented deluge of mail-in ballots, citing the COVID-19 pandemic as a rationale. But “Government is not free to disregard the [the Constitution] in times of crisis.” *Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn*, 592 U.S. at ___ (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

Similarly, failing to follow procedural requirements for amending election standards violates procedural due process. *Brown v. O’Brien*, 469 F.2d 563, 567 (D.C. Cir.), *vacated as moot*, 409 U.S. 816 (1972). Under this Court’s precedents on procedural due process, not only intentional failure to follow election law as enacted by a State’s legislature but also random and unauthorized acts by state election officials and their designees in local government can violate the Due Process Clause. *Parratt v. Taylor*, 451

U.S. 527, 537-41 (1981), *overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams*, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); *Hudson v. Palmer*, 468 U.S. 517, 532 (1984). Here, the violations all were intentional, even if done for the reason of addressing the COVID-19 pandemic.

While Plaintiff State disputes that exercising this Court’s original jurisdiction is discretionary, *see* Section III, *infra*, the clear unlawful abrogation of Defendant States’ election laws designed to ensure election integrity by a few officials, and examples of material irregularities in the 2020 election cumulatively warrant exercising jurisdiction. Although isolated irregularities could be “garden-variety” election disputes that do not raise a federal question,¹⁰ the closeness of election results in swing states combines with unprecedented expansion in the use of fraud-prone mail-in ballots—millions of which were also mailed out—and received and counted—without verification—often in violation of express state laws by non-legislative actors, *see* Sections II.A.1-II.A.2, *supra*, call both the result and the process into question. For an office as important as the presidency, these clear violations of the Constitution, coupled with a reasonable inference of unconstitutional ballots being cast in numbers that far exceed the margin of former Vice President Biden’s vote tally over President Trump demands the attention of this Court.

¹⁰ “To be sure, ‘garden variety election irregularities’ may not present facts sufficient to offend the Constitution’s guarantee of due process[.]” *Hunter*, 635 F.3d at 232 (quoting *Griffin*, 570 F.2d at 1077-79).

While investigations into allegations of unlawful votes being counted and fraud continue, even the appearance of fraud in a close election would justify exercising the Court's discretion to grant the motion for leave to file. Regardless, Defendant States' violations of the Constitution would warrant this Court's review, even if no election fraud had resulted.

B. A ruling on the 2020 election would preserve the Constitution and help prevent irregularities in future elections.

In addition to ensuring that the 2020 presidential election is resolved in a manner consistent with the Constitution, this Court must review the violations that occurred in Defendant States to enable Congress and State legislatures to avoid future chaos and constitutional violations. Unless this Court acts to review this presidential election, these unconstitutional and unilateral violations of state election laws will continue in the future.

Regardless of how the 2020 election resolves and whatever this Court does with respect to the 2020 election, it is imperative for our system of government that elections follow the clear constitutional mandates for all future elections. Just as this Court in *Bush II* provided constitutional guidance to all states regarding the equal treatment of ballots from county to county in 2000, this Court should now provide a clear statement that non-legislative modification of rules governing presidential elections violate the Electors Clause. Such a ruling will discourage in the future the kind of non-legislative election modifications that proliferated in 2020.

III. REVIEW IS NOT DISCRETIONARY.

Although this Court’s original jurisdiction precedents would justify the Court’s hearing this matter under the Court’s discretion, *see* Section II, *supra*, Plaintiff State respectfully submits that the Court’s review is not discretionary. To the contrary, the plain text of § 1251(a) provides *exclusive* jurisdiction, not discretionary jurisdiction. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a). In addition, no other remedy exists for these interstate challenges, *see* Section I.G, *supra*, and *some* court must have jurisdiction for these weighty issues. *See Mostyn v. Fabrigas*, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1028 (K.B. 1774) (“if there is no other mode of trial, that alone will give the King’s courts a jurisdiction”). As individual Justices have concluded, the issue “bears reconsideration.” *Nebraska v. Colorado*, 136 S.Ct. 1034, 1035 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Alito, J.); *accord New Mexico v. Colorado*, 137 S.Ct. 2319 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same). Plaintiff State respectfully submits that that reconsideration would be warranted to the extent that the Court does not elect to hear this matter in its discretion.

IV. THIS CASE WARRANTS SUMMARY DISPOSITION OR EXPEDITED BRIEFING.

The issues presented here are neither fact-bound nor complex, and their vital importance urgently needs a resolution. Plaintiff State will move this Court for expedited consideration but also suggest that this case is a prime candidate for summary disposition because the material facts—namely, that the COVID-19 pandemic prompted non-legislative actors to unlawfully modify Defendant States’ election laws, and carry out an election in violation of basic voter

integrity statutes—are not in serious dispute. *California v. United States*, 457 U.S. 273, 278 (1982); *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966). This case presents a pure and straightforward question of law that requires neither finding additional facts nor briefing beyond the threshold issues presented here.

CONCLUSION

Leave to file the Bill of Complaint should be granted.

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Respectfully submitted,

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